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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LAWMAKING PROCESSES:
CONSTRAINING OR EMPOWERING THE EXECUTIVE?
Aida Torres Pgrez*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that globalization and the proliferation of
international regimes have contributed to constrain executive power,
compromising state sovereignty. While some celebrate this result, others decry
or deny it. The executive needs to introduce new forms of action to face the
challenges posed by globalization, transcending the national/international
dichotomy. As such, the term "internationalization of lawmaking processes"
refers broadly to the new context in which public decision-making takes place
within multiple inter-, supra-, and trans-national spheres. This article will
demonstrate that although from an overall perspective globalization constrains
state power, if one focuses on the state's constituting branches, the
internationalization of lawmaking processes has brought about a comparative
empowerment of the executive, at the expense of the legislative.
Therefore, the question posed in the title has a double answer: the
internationalization of lawmaking processes constrains the power of the state as
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a whole, while it transforms and enhances executive power. Accordingly, this
article will identify a double parallel process consisting of de-centralization of
state power among a plurality of spheres and re-centralization of power in the
executive. As such, this argument develops in two main sections.
The first section will show how, as a result of globalization, public power is
fragmented and the ability of sovereign states to freely design and implement
public policies is constrained. Agreements reached or norms crafted within
forums beyond the state are directly implemented in the state territory or shape
domestic lawmaking. The law ultimately enforced derives from sources that are
not exclusively national. These transformations challenge the traditional
sovereignty paradigm, as the unlimited, ultimate, and indivisible power to
govern over a bounded territory without external influences.] Sovereignty is not
merely lost, but the state needs to introduce new forms in the exercise of its
functions. As public functions are fragmented among multiple spheres, so is the
state in its constitutive units. This article thus proceeds to explore the impact of
the new dynamics upon the constitutional balance of powers.
The second section will examine the transformation and enhancement of
executive power in this globalized context, in which international lawmaking is
also transformed and diversified. The diversification of international lawmaking
sources offers the executive new opportunities for action. In particular, this
article will emphasize how the executive needs to adapt to new forms of
lawmaking in multiple spheres, in collaboration with foreign authorities and
private actors. The tendency is to recentralize power in the executive. To prove
this claim, this article will examine three interrelated fields: regulation through
international treaties and other forms of transnational collaboration, political
decision-making within international organizations, and the implementation of
international norms within domestic legal orders. Eventually, these
transformations may well enhance the executive's ability to shape national
policy-making and regulate citizens' lives, while sidestepping the legislative.
2
Thus, these new dynamics alter the domestic institutional balance (without
amending the constitutional text).3 It is important to understand the kinds of
1. See DEIETER GRIMM, The Modem State: Continental Traditions, in GUIDANCE, CONTROL
AND EVALUATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 89, 91-94 (Franz-Xaver Kaufmann et al. eds., 1986)
(concerning the origins of the concept of sovereignty and the modem state).
2. PAUL WEBB & THOMAS POGUNTKE, The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic
Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences, in THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES 336, 350 (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds.,
2006).
3. See also Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance - Possibilities
for and Limits to the Development of an International Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170, 193-196 (noting that constitutions need to be complemented with
other documents to obtain a complete picture of the structure of the public authority; as a
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transformations underway to properly address the contested legitimacy of the
new order. Along these lines, this article will reflect on the normative concerns
arising from the standpoint of democracy. The article will suggest an account
grounded on the ideal of institutional balance to explain and justify current
practices and formulate institutional arrangements to improve the legitimacy of
lawmaking processes developing within inter-, supra-, and trans-national
spheres. The European Union (EU) is a paradigmatic example to illustrate these
new dynamics. The conceptual framework suggested, however, may be applied
to other areas as well.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWERS
Globalization, understood broadly as a set of processes transcending
• 4.
national borders, has led to growing interdependence in multiple fields such as
economics, the environment, telecommunications, security, intellectual property
rights, public health, and others. On some occasions, the response to this
growing interdependence has been the creation of international regulatory
regimes or other forms of collaboration through more informal transnational
networks. This article will focus on this aspect of globalization, which involves
the internationalization of lawmaking processes.5
Today, there is a broad range of international treaties and organizations,
with different goals, institutions, and powers, all seeking to impact diverse areas
from international trade to human rights. The most advanced example is the EU,
whose main goal was creating a common market and furthering economic
integration. EU powers have increased quantitatively and qualitatively, covering
issues concerning citizens not only as economic actors, but also impinging on
other spheres of their lives. The attribution of sovereign powers to EU
institutions has constrained member states' decision-making powers not only in
the trade and monetary domains, but also in a great variety of fields such as
agriculture, fisheries, transportation, food safety, consumer protection, and
immigration. In the economic realm as well, at a global scale, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) aims to reduce barriers to international trade and eliminate
discriminatory practices among the states. The agreements adopted within the
WTO framework constrain national policies in relevant ways. Moreover, dispute
consequence, constitutions are better seen as "partial constitutions," since they no longer
comprehensively regulate public authority exercised within the state).
4. ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 7-8 (Longman ed.,
2001).
5. To be sure, globalization might interchangeably refer to political, economic, and social
processes transcending national boundaries, as well as to the creation of international regimes and
other forms of cooperation to regulate these processes (which is properly a response to
globalization).
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resolution before the WTO Appellate Body, whose decisions are binding, not
only impinges upon foreign trade, but also upon issues such as the environment,
consumer protection, public health, national security, and even human rights.6
Other organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the International
Labor Organization, whether their decisions are strictly binding or not, have had
an important impact not only upon state legal orders, but also, indirectly, upon
the people.
7
More informally, transnational collaboration among government authorities
has intensified, leading to the proliferation of the so-called "transnational
government networks." These networks might exist within the framework of
international organizations, executive agreements, or develop spontaneously. 9
For example, they encompass networks of trade ministers within the WTO as
well as networks, such as the G8 or the Basel Committee, which, albeit not
grounded on a treaty, have acquired certain stability. Within these networks,
lawmaking powers are not attributed to any separate international body. Rather,
they offer a framework for state authorities to cooperate and exercise their
functions in collaboration with foreign authorities. Often, codes of conduct,
recommendations, or regulatory principles are issued, which, despite not being
binding norms (soft law), may well influence lawmaking processes within
domestic legal systems.
10
In general, the creation of international regimes and the allocation of state
functions at the international level have been justified through the argument that
states' ability to effectively rule within their respective territories has been
undermined as a consequence of mounting political and economic
interdependence.l' If states cannot comply with their functions and goals, this
inability threatens their legitimacy. Hence, effective regulation regarding
specific subject matters requires a supranational form of action. 12 Similarly,
6. Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law,
35 J. WORLD TRADE 167 (2001).
7. Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy
and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 35 (2003).
8. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (identifying and thoroughly
exploring this phenomenon, Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote several articles and ultimately a book).
9. Id. at 45-49.
10. See id. at 168-95 (pending still in this area is extensive empirical research).
11. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions, in
IDEAS AND IDEALS: ESSAYS ON POLITICS IN HONOR OF STANLEY HOFFMANN 91, 92 (Linda B. Miller
& Michael Smith eds., 1993) (Asserting that "[i]t is now a platitude that the ability of governments
to attain their objectives through individual action has been undermined by international political
and economic interdependence."); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a
Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2004).
12. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005).
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transnational networks allow governments to achieve through mutual
cooperation what they could previously achieve within their respective territories
unilaterally. 13
Although states retain coercive powers, public power is fragmented in the
sense that political decision-making takes place in a plurality of forums at inter-,
supra-, and trans-national levels. 14  These diverse forms of international
decision-making very often influence or even shape the content of national
policies and laws. Some domestic norms merely reproduce or develop norms or
decisions taken within networks or international systems. 15  Hence, the
proliferation of international regulatory regimes (especially if international
bodies are granted the power to enact binding law) constrains state power to
formulate and implement public policies. 16  Thus, the internationalization of
lawmaking processes challenges sovereignty as "the political authority within
which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations, and
policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly."
1 7
It is worth noting that whether states participate in international regimes or
refuse to engage in collective decision-making in the international sphere,
sovereignty is challenged. In the latter case, however, the loss of control might
be even greater because the states cannot effectively regulate in isolation,
processes developing beyond or interfering within national borders as a
consequence of globalization. The global economy, which involves the
internationalization of production, financial transactions, and trade, is the
clearest example of how globalization undermines the ability of states to control
their own (in this case economic) futures. 18 Furthermore, the vacuum left tends
to be occupied by private actors who develop transnational regulatory systems
that could create policy externalities and thus incentives for broader policy
13. Slaughter, supra note 11, at 285.
14. Jost Delbruck, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public
Authority Beyond the State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 39 (2004) (stating that "the
concept of public authority is not restricted to the exercise of enforcement powers").
15. Delbruck, supra note 7, at 35-36 ("[D]omestic law that appears to be genuinely
'homemade' is actually nothing but a rubberstamped regulation worked out at the level of IGOs.").
For example, in the EU, many national norms merely reproduce what was established in EU
directives or refer to the text of the directive itself. SUE ARROWSMITH, Legal Techniques for
implementing Directives. A Case Study of Public Procurement, in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 491 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
16. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 100 (1995) (Distinguishing between
sovereignty and autonomy because "sovereignty refers to the entitlement of a state to rule over a
bounded territory, while autonomy denotes the actual power a nation-state possesses to articulate
and achieve policy goals independently." While arguing as well that globalization and the
proliferation of international regimes have an impact upon both.).
17. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 342 (2d ed. 1996).
18. Id. at 343-85.
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coordination.19 International law and other forms of transnational coordination
offer tools to regulate these processes.
In this context, we can no longer understand sovereignty according to the
modem conceptual paradigm of the nation-state, as bundling all public power
within state boundaries. Public power is fragmented, and state functions are
exercised in a plurality of forums beyond the state, in collaboration with other
public and private actors. This is not to say that states are disappearing and
being replaced with supranational institutions. The states themselves, albeit not
exclusively, promote the development of international law in its different
forms. In the words of Saskia Sassen, "rather than sovereignty eroding as a
consequence of globalization and supranational organizations, it is being
transformed." 21 At the birth of the modem state, there was a correspondence
between sovereignty-as the scope of state power-and the national territory.
As a result of the internationalization of lawmaking, the location of public power
is partially shifted and reconstituted in other spheres. 22  As a result, the
boundaries of domestic policy-making are increasingly blurred, "transforming
the conditions of political decision-making, changing the institutional and
organizational context of national polities, altering the legal framework and
administrative practices of governments."
23
Globalization brings about transformations not only for the modem state,
but also for international law. The scope and structures of international law
change. International treaties regulate issues traditionally regulated at the
domestic level.24 The powers attributed to international organizations expand in
scope and nature. There is a trend toward a higher degree of institutionalization
and coordination of international decision-making. At the same time,
19. One of the effects of globalization has been the blurring of the public/private distinction.
The increasing role of private actors in international lawmaking raises particular problems for
global governance. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 10 ("[W]e need global rules without centralized
power but with government actors who can be held to account through a variety of political
mechanisms. These government actors can and should interact with a wide range of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), but their role in governance bears distinct and different
responsibilities.").
20. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 29 (1996)
("The state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has
emerged quite altered by this participation.").
21. Id. at31.
22. Id. at 29-30 ("Sovereignty remains a feature of the system, but it is now located in a
multiplicity of institutional arenas: the new emergent transnational private legal regimes, new
supranational organizations (such as the WTO and the institutions of the European Union), and the
various international human rights codes.").
23. HELD, supra note 16, at 135.
24. See infra section A.
25. Walter, supra note 3, at 175-83; HELD, supra note 17, at 346-348; see infra section B.
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cooperation is intensified as a result of the proliferation of more informal
transnational networks. Also, actors involved in policy-making in these multiple
spheres diversify. Within the executive, diplomatic delegations are replaced
with a variety of ministers, as well as other second-level officials and regulators
from independent agencies appointed by governments. Furthermore,
globalization enhances transnational regulation carried out by a variety of private
actors, 26 and hybrid arrangements between governmental and non-governmental
actors.27  As a result, the production of international law becomes
decentralized.
28
At the same time, state powers are fragmented and exercised in several
spheres. As public power is disaggregated, so is the state. 29 Instead of
conceiving the state as an indivisible unit, if one focuses on the distinct state
branches-executive, legislative, and judicial3 0 -it will be realized that
disaggregating public functions among inter-, supra-, and trans-national spheres
has enhanced executive power to the detriment of the legislative. Therefore, we
are witnessing a twofold, only apparently paradoxical, process: de-centralization
of state powers in a plurality of spheres and re-centralization of power in the
executive.
Ill. TRANSFORMING AND ENHANCING EXECUTIVE POWER
Arguably, the executive has traditionally had a major role regarding
international lawmaking. Nonetheless, it is important to realize how both
international lawmaking and executive action have been transformed, eventually
enhancing the executive's ability to shape national policy-making. Precisely
because international lawmaking is no longer limited to international treaties
negotiated by diplomatic missions, the internationalization of lawmaking
processes offers new opportunities for executive action, if the executive is
willing to engage in international collective decision-making. To demonstrate
how executive action is transformed and executive power eventually enhanced
vis-A-vis the legislative, three related fields will be considered: (a) collaboration
through international regimes and transnational networks; (b) political decision-
making within international organizations; and (c) subsequent implementation of
international norms within domestic legal orders. The combined exploration of
26. Walter, supra note 3, at 186-87; Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 22-23.
27. Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 22.
28. Walter, supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that the international legal order becomes
decentralized).
29. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183,184 (1997) ("The
state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.").
30. Although courts are essential for the transformation of the international legal order and state
sovereignty, they are not discussed in this paper.
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these processes reveals a picture of the state that distorts the constitutional
balance of powers.
A. Collaboration through international regimes and transnational networks
Historically, treaty-making was a sovereign power of the monarch
associated to the ius belli.31 As a result of liberal revolutions at the end of the
eighteenth century, sovereignty was transferred from the monarch to the people.
Thus, modem constitutions allocate the power to conclude international treaties
to the executive (as the representative of the state), but tend to require the
intervention of parliament (as representative of the sovereign people) for their
ratification (or for establishing domestic binding force).32 From this perspective,
parliamentary consent is essential to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of
international treaties.
With regard to the ratification process, parliamentary approval might be
required for all kinds of treaties or only for treaties regulating specific subjects,
such as treaties concerning the state's integrity, activities of a military or
commercial nature, imposing financial burdens, or treaties requiring the
amendment of domestic law.3 3  In some countries, the ratification of
international treaties might not require explicit parliamentary approval.34  In
general, countries that do not require parliamentary approval for ratification tend
to be dualist, which means that international treaties do not have binding force
within the domestic legal order until they have been incorporated through
national legislation. Hence, from the standpoint of constitutional structure, to
commit the state internationally (and/or to grant treaties domestic biding force),
parliamentary intervention is required. Therefore, in principle, this could be
regarded as a shared power.
Notwithstanding these constitutional provisions, parliamentary intervention
in the process of treaty ratification is very limited in nature. First of all, the
executive is the one in charge of initiating negotiations. Generally, the power to
31. Peter Haggenmacher, Some Hints on the European Origins of Legislative Participation in
the Treaty-making Function, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 313, 318 (1991).
32. One should distinguish between parliamentary approval regarding the ratification of
international treaties from their "incorporation" in the domestic legal order. Parliamentary
approval, when required, is a condition for ratification and thus for obliging the state
internationally. Incorporation refers to the process whereby treaties acquire domestic binding
force. The binding effect of treaties within the domestic legal order might require specific national
legislation incorporating the treaty or not, according to domestic provisions. See Francis G.
Jacobs, Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW xxiii, xxiv-xxvi (Francis G.
Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
33. Parliamentary approval is required for specific subject matters in Belgium, France,
Germany, and Spain, among others.
34. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the government may proceed to ratify international
treaties, as long as there is no explicit parliamentary opposition.
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conclude treaties has been attributed to the minister of foreign affairs, but other
members of the executive are increasingly participating, in accordance to the
type of agreement being negotiated. The drafting process is conducted through
negotiations among governmental authorities behind closed doors. In contrast to
the legislative process, the drafting of international treaties does not permit
public scrutiny. On occasions, government consults parliament in an informal
manner during the negotiations. This practice varies across countries.
35
Broadly, the negotiation stage is characterized by its secrecy and lack of
transparency, which has been a recurrent criticism regarding the process for
concluding and amending EU Treaties.
36
With regard to parliamentary approval, the parliamentary debate is
generally not a thorough, substantive one. Access to information about the
negotiations is invariably limited, so that little is known about the alternatives
discussed.37 Treaties are brought to parliament once they have been adopted at
the international level. In practice, the "take it or leave it" option 38 profoundly
limits parliamentary autonomy to substantially modify the terms of the treaty or
reject it. Amendments are not allowed. Parliaments might qualify its consent by
entering reservations or interpretive declarations. 39 This possibility is, however,
limited by the terms of the treaty and general international law, which bans
reservations "inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treat,." 40 Thus,
parliamentary approval might be conceived as a mere rubber stamp. 4
Moreover, the substantive scope of international treaties has steadily
expanded to sectors previously in the domain of domestic legal orders.
Traditionally, international treaties were limited to issues of reciprocal interest to
sovereign states (basically, military assistance and borders) or issues of an
35. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary
Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 303 (1991).
36. Lars Hoffmann, The Convention on the Future of Europe - Thoughts on the Convention-
Model, I I (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Jean Monnet Ctr., Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 11/02,
2002), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021101.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2006) (The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was drafted by a newly created
"convention," which included national and European parliamentary representatives. This
convention drafted the texts that were later discussed by the representatives of the member states in
the Intergovernmental Conference.).
37. Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 200
(1999).
38. Id. at 185-86; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1971, 2007-08 (2004).
39. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 35, at 307.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
41. In those countries in which international treaties are hierarchically superior or cannot be
derogated or amended by law, the executive may constrain the legislative capacity of present and
future parliaments.
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administrative, technical nature.42 At present, the increasing interdependence
and complexity of economic, political, and social matters require international
regulation and stable cooperation regarding subjects, such as consumer
protection or fundamental rights, which were the domain of the legislative. As a
result, the executive enhances its ability to shape national politics under its
treaty-making power.
Besides international treaties, new forms of .informal cooperation among
national officials through a wide range of transnational networks have
developed. Thus, the executive role is increasingly complex. It is no longer
limited to negotiating international treaties with other governments. Executive
officials now participate in transnational networks, for instance, to distill
information, promote enforcement of national and international norms, or
enhance regulatory harmonization regarding a broad range of issues.4 3 It is
worth noting that the main participants in these networks are a variety of
governmental authorities, for example: presidents and prime ministers in G8
meetings; cabinet officials (and not only foreign ministers), such as ministers of
agriculture, education, justice, economy, and labor, among others, within the
Council of the Common Market (MERCOSUR), or the Council of Ministers
(EU); and regulators, such as central bankers in the Basel Committee. Hence,
also in this domain, parliaments are sidestepped. Anne-Marie Slaughter
indicates the existence of some transnational legislative networks, but she admits
that they are fewer and less effective. 44  Among the varied reasons for the
reduced number and efficacy are the following: given the variety of interests
represented, the issues dealt with, and the diversity of members, it is difficult to
identify counterparts in other countries; parliamentary representatives lack the
technical expertise in specific areas that promotes the development of
government networks; and since their terms in office tend to be short, they have
little incentive to establish long-term cooperation with foreign parliamentary
representatives, whom also change frequently.
45
B. Decision-making within the framework of international organizations
An important transformation, particularly since World War II, has been the
creation of international institutions with the power to adopt binding norms and
decisions.46  This transformation is particularly evident in the EU, where
42. See Walter, supra note 3, at 179-76.
43. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 7, 51-61.
44. Id. at 104-05.
45. Id. at 105.
46. Examples of these institutions include the EU, the Andean Community, the World Health
Organization, and the United Nations. Also, some treaties have set up courts to enforce treaty
provisions or decisions emanating from the institutions that have been established. This is the
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legislation emanating from EU institutions is directly applicable to citizens and
supreme over national law. The transfer of legislative powers to international or
supranational organizations has posed the greatest challenge to national
sovereignty. According to the common view, the new international institutions
are replacing the state. It should be noted, however, that the executive maintains
the ability to act decisively in the supranational sphere, whereas the legislative is
significantly weakened or lacks this capacity completely.
In the EU, national governments have an essential role regarding the
composition of the main legislative institutions. The European Council, which
defines the EU general political orientation, is comprised of the heads of state or
government from the member states. The Council of Ministers, which is the
main decision-making body, represents the interests of the member states. It is
comprised of one minister from each state, which is usually the minister
responsible for the subject under discussion, such as agriculture, transportation,
social affairs, or justice. The COREPER, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives of the member states, was set up to prepare the work of the
Council. It is comprised of officials at a lower level than the ministers.
The EU Commission is the driving force in the legislative process since it
has the right to propose draft legislation, and it embodies the community interest.
Before the Nice Treaty (2001), its members were appointed by the state
governments. At present, the Commission's appointment corresponds to the
Council (in its composition as the heads of state or government) by a qualified
majority voting. Nonetheless, this modification does not have much practical
relevance, since the heads of state or government were those who appointed the
commissioners before the Nice Treaty. Arguably, qualified majority voting
could introduce a different dynamic. The Nice Treaty, however, establishes that
the Council shall adopt the list of candidates "drawn up in accordance with the
proposals made by each Member State." 47 Hence, ultimately, each national
government can nominate one commissary. The ability to nominate them
demonstrates the privileged position of national governments over parliaments.
The European Parliament is elected by European citizens and represents
them. It has had a secondary role in the legislative process, but as a consequence
of the extension of the co-decision procedure it has "come close to attaining co-
case, for instance, of the European Court of Justice in the EU, the European Court of Human
Rights in the European Convention of Human Rights, or the Appellate Body in the WTO.
47. Treaty Establishing the European Union, Dec. 12, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 121 art. 214
[hereinafter EC Treaty]; TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
13 (2003) ("If it were really true that the Commissioners did not in some sense represent their
states, there would be no reason why they should be appointed on the nomination of their own
governments.").
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equal status ... with the Council"'4 8 regarding an increasing number of subjects.
Moreover, the Commission, as a body, is subject to a vote of approval by the EU
Parliament and the candidates are subject to hearings. The Parliament, however,
cannot reject single candidates, which weakens its power of control.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) judges are appointed by the common
accord of the member states' governments and there is one judge per member
state. 49 This is not to suggest that the ECJ acts according to state preferences,
but to emphasize that governments appoint ECJ judges, without parliamentary
intervention.
It is easily realized that national parliaments are invariably absent from the
composition and functioning of EU institutions. Particularly since the 1980s,
national parliaments have adopted a more active role. They have expressed a
desire for greater intervention in community affairs, but little has been done to
realize this aspiration. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) included two declarations
calling for greater dissemination of information to national parliaments from
governments, and the creation of a Conference of National Parliaments
(COSAC), which would be consulted regarding significant EU issues. The
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) included a Protocol that timidly promoted the role of
COSAC and insisted on the need for national governments to inform parliaments
about Commission legislative drafts. These initiatives have not succeeded in
effectively promoting the role of national parliaments in EU lawmaking
51processes.
As a result of European integration, member states' powers to unilaterally
formulate domestic policies in myriad fields are constrained (especially when
unanimity in the Council is not required). EU institutions, however, are not
bodies totally separate from the states. States do not disappear, but they instead
subsist in the executives. The executives established the new institutional
structure through treaties and continue to participate in EU institutions'
functioning in different ways. What is more, within the Council, governments
enjoy broader decision-makinf powers than they do domestically since they are
not subject to the legislative. At the same time, national executives need to
readapt to a new way of exercising their functions and must coordinate their
action with foreign governments, through negotiation and dialogue. These sort
of institutions, comprised of government members, such as the Council, might
48. Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 38 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Btrca eds., 1999).
49. EC Treaty art. 221.
50. Philip Norton, National Parliaments and the European Union: Where to from Here?, in
LAWMAKING IN THE EU 209, 211 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
51. Id. at 212.
52. ARACELI MANGAS MARTiN, DERECHO COMUNITARIO EUROPEO Y DERECHO ESPAqOL 187 (2d
ed. 1987).
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be seen as an extension of executive power at the international level, or at least
as providing a framework for supranational decision-making by executives.
International executive action should be regarded in connection with domestic
functions, instead of occurring in a separate sphere. 53 As a consequence, the
traditional dichotomy between the national and international spheres tends to
blur. In sum, executives participate in lawmaking processes at the supranational
level and thus shape domestic policies, while national legislatives are essentially
left aside.
54
C. Implementing international norms within domestic legal orders
Broadly speaking, international treaties or other norms emanating from
international organizations might be directly applicable (self-executing) or not
(non-self-executing) within domestic legal orders. The latter, but sometimes the
former too, require implementing national norms. Such implementation might
leave a margin of discretion to national authorities. Thus, it is important to
decide which institution is in charge of implementing international norms.
With the implementation of EU law, the member states' duty of
collaboration is combined with the principle of institutional and procedural
autonomy. As such, EU law does not prescribe the bodies and proceedings for
implementing EU legislation. Thus, the states will proceed according to
domestic constitutional provisions. Yet, the implementation of EU law tips the
institutional balance in favor of the executive.
The main EU norms are regulations and directives. EU regulations are
essentially legislative acts creating rights and obligations for EU citizens.
Usually, EU regulations need no further implementation. Sometimes, however,
enforcement measures are needed, such as when a regulation explicitly calls for
enforcement, or the terms of the regulation are rather vague. On the contrary,
directives are not directly applicable within domestic legal systems.5 5 They are
binding as to results to be achieved, but leave to the national authorities the
53. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 223.
54. Thomas Poguntke, A Presidentializing Party State? The Federal Republic of Germany, in
THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES 63, 68-
69 (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds., 2005) (Regarding Germany, Poguntke explains how the
shift of powers to the EU has "introduced a significant 'executive bias' into the process of national
policy formulation. When the chancellor (or a government minister) comes back from a European
or international summit, they are usually in no position to negotiate the results with their
parliamentary majority .... What has been agreed between representatives of national
governments can hardly be unravelled by national parliaments.").
55. However, the ECJ has admitted that some directives are applicable under certain
circumstances. See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; see also Case
158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1980
E.C.R. 1805.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
choice of form and method to achieve. Hence, it is for each state to decide
whether the legislative or the executive should transpose EU directives.
In practice, since the general regulation of specific subject matters is
contained in EU norms, the most common form of action turns out to be
implementation by the executive. With regard to EU regulations, given their
degree of detail and direct applicability, the executive is usually in charge of
issuing implementing norms, in case they are needed. With regard to directives,
in opposition to conventional wisdom, for example in Spain, a surprisingly high
number of directives are transposed by means of executive regulations (real
decretos u 6rdenes ministeriales). Since Spain's accession to the EU, only an
approximate 15% of all transposing norms are statutes. 57 Moreover, transposing
laws very often merely reproduce directive provisions.
Concurrently, some scholars argue that the legislative process is not
advisable for the everyday implementation of EU law 58 for several reasons:
legislative procedures are slow and complex; it is pointless reopening the
political debate; amendments are not permitted; and the sovereign nature of the
legislative is "hardly compatible with a function subordinated to the principles,
goals, and context of EU norms." 59  In contrast, executive decision-making
procedures are thought to be better fitted to the application of EU law, since they
are simpler, faster, and more efficient. Furthermore, governments were
involved, as members of the Council, in the drafting of the EU legislation being
implemented.
6 1
Additionally, in several member states, parliaments have generally
authorized governments to enact norms with force of law to implement EU law.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the same statute that incorporated EU law
56. "EU regulations," which are legislative norms emanating from EU institutions, should not
be confused with "executive regulations," which are norms issued by national executives within
domestic systems.
57. Subdirecci6n General de Asuntos Legales Comunitarios de la Secretarfa de Estado para la
Uni6n Europea, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperaci6n, March 13, 2006. According
to data provided by the General Secretary of the European Commission, March 30, 2006, in Spain,
the percentage of directives transposed by statute is 12.9%. Note that these figures are not
measuring exactly the same, and that the percentage of directives transposed by statute might be
lower than the percentage of transposing norms that are statutes because the same directive might
be transposed by more than one legislative act. All the colleagues I told about these figures were
struck by these low percentages.
58. MANGAS MARTIN, supra note 52, at 185; Vjjm Bekkers et al., Going Dutch: Problems and
Policies concerning the Implementation of EU Legislation in the Netherlands, in LAWMAKING IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 454, 459 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
59. ARACELI MANGAS MARTIN & DIEGO J. LNrAN NOGUERAS, INSTITUCIONES Y DERECHO DE LA
UNION EUROPEA 502 (2005) [authors's translation].
60. MARTIN, supra note 52, at 192; Vjjm Bekkers et al., supra note 58, at 459, 465.
61. MARTIN, supra note 52, at 192.
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within the domestic legal order, the European Communities Act 1972,
authorized government to enact norms "as might be made by Act of
Parliament." 2 In Spain, such general legislative delegations are banned by
article 82 of the Constitution, but legislative delegations for implementing EU
law are admitted within the constitutional limits. Finally, "decree-laws," which
allow government to enact norms with force of law in case of "extraordinary and
urgent necessity," could be used, for example, when the deadline to transpose
directives is about to elapse, thus avoiding the violation of EU law.
Therefore, with regard to the implementation of EU law, the legislative is
commonly bypassed by the executive, which alters the interplay between
legislative/executive acts. The dominant scholarly opinion in Spain rejects
"independent" executive regulations, which are those not developing previous
legislative acts. 63 As a consequence of EU integration, however, the executive
may enact independent regulations (directly implementing EU law). Formally,
these regulations are not independent from EU "legislation." Yet, from the
standpoint of the democratic principle, these regulations are independent from
norms enacted by the body democratically representing the people.
In addition, constitutions might "reserve" specific subjects to the
legislative, such as consumer protection or internal trade according to the
Spanish constitution. This means that parliament has the exclusive right to
legislate on the "reserved" areas. The executive may only intervene to merely
complement legislative acts when expressly authorized by parliament. When
reserved subjects are transferred to the EU, parliament's autonomy is
significantly (or totally) constrained. The legislative is not directly replaced with
the executive, but with EU institutions. Yet, as argued before, the executive
participates in the Council.
On the whole, with regard to subjects allocated to the EU, parliaments are
bypassed in their main legislative function.64 First, the general regulation of a
wide range of subjects (whether under parliamentary reserve or not) takes place
at the EU level, in which executives have the ability to act through the Council.
Second, within the domestic legal order, EU law is primarily implemented
through executive regulations. Thus, once specific subjects are transferred to the
EU, the executive enhances its decision-making powers over these subjects.
62. John A. Usher, The Legal Framework for Implementation in the United Kingdom, in
IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: STRUCTURES FOR INDIRECT RULE 98 (Terence
Daintith ed., 1995); see MARTfN, supra note 52, at 194-96 (for other countries that adopted general
legislative delegations).
63. GARCIA DE ENTERRiA, I CURSO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIvO 214-17 (2004) ("Regulations
cannot be independent from statutes, for the simple reason that the creation of objective norms for
the citizens cannot be independent from the Law in the modem state" [author's translation].).
64. LUCIANO PAREJO ALFONSO, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 202 (2003).
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On a different note, the new functions stemming from European integration
have led to the reorganization of domestic administrative structures. The
national will expressed at the international level is shaped within the public
administration, which also carries out a main role regarding implementation. As
a result, the national administration tends to expand. In the words of Luciano
Parejo, "Supranational integration constitutes a main factor for the
transformation of the administration and national administrative law. The reason
is clear[:] it extends the function of national public administrations, turning them
into indirect administrations of the community-European sphere." 65 In Spain,
EU integration has had an important impact upon administrative organization.
The Secretary of State for the EU, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was
set up to "coordinate the action of the Spanish administration within the
Community institutions." The Secretary of State for the EU encompasses the
General Secretary for the EU, the General Directorate for Integration and
Coordination of Economic and General Affairs, and the General Directorate for
Coordinating the Internal Market and other Community Policies. Each of these
units is divided into several sub-general directorates. Moreover, other units and
specialized bodies have proliferated within the several ministries to develop
functions related to specific supranational policies affecting their respective
fields. Inter-ministerial commissions have also been created to coordinate the
several ministries.
IV. THE CONTESTED LEGITIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
LAWMAKING PROCESSES
The mounting concentration of power in the executive, vis-A-vis the
legislative, within domestic legal orders has long been a subject of concern.66
This tendency has only been exacerbated as a consequence of the
internationalization of lawmaking processes. The development of full-fledged
international regulatory regimes covering myriad subjects and the intense
collaboration through transnational networks heavily influence or even shape
domestic policy-making and ultimately the regulation of citizens' everyday lives.
Hence, the declining role of national parliaments is troublesome from the
standpoint of the democratic legitimacy of the new lawmaking processes and
legal outcomes. Critics condemn the distortion of the domestic balance of
interests and policy-making processes.
65. Id. at 204 [author's translation].
66. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE B(JRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 169 (2003)
("Executives tend to be dominant in most modem domestic polities .... The idea that national
parliaments really control the emergence or content of legislative norms no longer comports with
reality."); see also Martin Shapiro, Implementation, Discretion and Rules, in COMPLIANCE
ENFORCEMENT EUR. COMMUNITY L. 27 (J. A. E. Vervaele ed., 1999).
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One might think that in presidential systems, as opposed to parliamentary
systems, the decline of national parliaments and the parallel enhancement of
executive power do not threaten democratic values, since presidents are directly
elected by the people. 67 It should be noted that without taking into account other
features of these systems, the mere difference regarding direct election does not
seem to be enough to support this claim. While presidents might have a stronger
representative claim than prime ministers in parliamentary systems;
parliamentary systems offer parliaments important mechanisms to claim political
responsibility on the prime minister,6 8 which could be used to monitor
international executive action. For example, in the worst case scenario, the
censorship motion allows parliaments to vote prime ministers out of office for
political reasons. Furthermore, presidents tend to be institutionally stronger than
prime ministers (and in many instances they have shown a tendency to abuse
mechanisms available to them, such as decree-laws). 69 Thus, the general trend
toward enhancement of executive power due to globalization could be escalated
in presidential systems. Since there are always two sides to these arguments, it
is difficult to broadly sustain that the enhancement of executive power is less
problematic in presidential systems from the standpoint of democracy.
In addition, the fact that both parliament and president are directly elected
does not mean they have the same claim to democratic representation, basically
for reasons of composition, decision-making processes, and accountability.
Parliaments encompass majorities and minorities, and the legislative process
secures that the plurality of interests will be taken into account. Despite the fact
that legislative practice is far from ideal, the requirements of deliberation,
publicity, and transparency favor mutual accommodation of conflicting interests
and public control by the electorate. Since more and more issues are decided at
the international level, legislative autonomy and parliamentary control over the
executive have been undermined. Although it might well be that democratic
theory does not dictate the terms in which power is shared, it requires securing a
system of checks and balances. If the internationalization of lawmaking
processes increasingly tips the balance in favor the executive (acting beyond the
state), at least, this should raise some flags from the vantage of representative
democracy. 70 This is not an end point, but just a departure point for reflection.
As this article will argue, new forms of international lawmaking are not
67. As Owen Fiss suggested in his remarks to this panel.
68. After all, in parliamentary systems, parliaments elect prime ministers and the confidence
given to prime ministers in the nomination act needs to be maintained throughout their mandate.
69. Angelina Cheibub Figuereido & Fernando Limongi, Constitutional Change, Legislative
Performance and Institutional Consolidation, 1 BRAZ. REV. Soc. Sci. 73 (2000).
70. Rubenfeld, supra note 38, at 2009 ("The fact that the President chiefly manages US foreign
relations exacerbates, rather than relieves, American constitutional anxieties about the ability of
treaties to override the ordinary legislative process.").
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undemocratic or illegitimate, but one needs to acknowledge the concerns arising
from the representative democratic model and recast the sources of legitimacy.
From this perspective, one should then proceed to rethink the institutional
design.
To counteract the declining role of the legislative power, some have
proposed enhancing parliamentary participation in the international sphere. A
world (or international-regional) parliament, however, is not such a viable
option, among other reasons, because it is dubious whether at that level exists (or
might exist) the kind of collective national identity (demos) that representative
democracy requires as grounding the legitimate functioning of democratic
systems. As most analysts agree, even the EU, with a high degree of
integration, still lacks a European demos. Consequently, the democratic deficit
cannot simply be solved by granting more powers to the European Parliament.
72
A European collective identity, however, could evolve in the future.73 In any
event, to understand the European demos as replicating national identity would
be not only quite unfeasible, but not even desirable.74  Thus, instead of
discussing whether an inter-national demos exists or might exist in the future, it
seems more promising to overcome the traditional way of thinking about the
demos. Instead, the idea of community should be reformulated on the basis of
other elements that might promote common identity and solidarity among
diverse peoples to legitimize collective decision-making. 75 In addition, there are
other operational drawbacks to a world parliament, such as the difficulties for
effective representation when representatives are too remote from the citizenry.
Also, the variety of forms and contexts of international lawmaking might require
diverse forms of legitimacy, other than the purely representative. Finally, the
skepticism towards this option is also grounded on efficacy concerns, since
executive action-being more flexible, fast, and technical--can better respond to
the needs of globalization.
71. The demos (or the "people") justifies that minorities are bound by decisions taken by a
majority. I am not suggesting that within each state there is a perfectly homogeneous and uniform
demos. I only mean to emphasize that the liberal representative democratic model presupposes
this. If the demos idea is already problematic within state borders, it is much more dubious at the
international level. My concern in this paper is targeted to the international level, but it is
important to question and reformulate this paradigm at both levels. Jorge Contesse and Ezequiel
Nino challenged me on this issue.
72. Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282, 291-97 (1995).
73. See Jirgen Habermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe need a Constitution?',
EUR. L.J. 303, 305-07 (1995).
74. JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 341 (1999) ("It would be... ironic if
the ethos which rejected the boundary abuse of the nation-state gave birth to a polity with the same
potential for abuse.").
75. Along these lines, Habermas, supra note 73, at 305-07, insists on the need to develop
communication channels and a European sphere of public debate.
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Slaughter suggested that since the ideal of representative democracy is
going to remain, it is vital to develop transnational legislative networks.
7 6
According to this scholar, such networks would contribute to solving problems
regarding the distortion of national political processes. 77 Given the structural
reasons indicated before, however, such networks could hardly reach the level of
effectiveness of government networks. Furthermore, even if parliamentary
representatives participated and possibly contributed to the legitimacy of
lawmaking processes in the international sphere, the popular will would,
nonetheless, be distorted because national parliamentary representatives would
need to collaborate with foreign representatives, who represent other popular
wills. Therefore, the challenge to representative democracy cannot be solved by
merely developing parallel legislative networks.
The most effective function for national parliaments, sometimes underrated
in this context, is monitoring the executive through internal mechanisms, which
should be strengthened (or created anew) regarding international executive
action. The several members of the executive develop their functions in the
national and international spheres in such a way that their responsibilities should
be recast to include both. Hence, parliaments' abilities to participate and
monitor governmental international action should be enhanced, given the
increasing influence of international lawmaking upon the domestic legal order.
Along these lines, for example, ministers in the EU could be subject to a
"mandate" so that they shall follow in the Council of Ministers the positions
previously approved by the national parliament. 78 Also, national parliaments
could be consulted or even given the power to nominate members to the EU
Commission.
Under the conceptual framework of representative democracy, the problem
resides in globalization itself, as a denationalization process, and ultimately in
the breakdown of the national sovereignty paradigm. The model of democratic
legitimacy on the basis of popular consent presupposes a self-governing people
who determine their own future within the territorial boundaries of the state.
79
As a consequence of globalization, however, not all power exercised within the
state derives strictly from national sources. Lawmaking takes place in a
76. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1073 (2003).
77. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 238.
78. See supra note 50, at 216 (such as in Denmark).
79. See HELD, supra note 17 (without focusing on national boundaries, the ideal model of
representative democracy has already been questioned from both a descriptive and a normative
standpoint, and alternative models of democracy have been advanced, for instance: pluralist,
competitive elitist, or neocorporativist).
80. Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REv. 1, 16 (1993).
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plurality of centers beyond the state. 8 1 The fact that these processes do not fulfill
the classic democratic model does not mean that international law or other forms
of transnational decision-making are illegitimate. A concept of legitimacy that
presupposes the unity of state-power-nation cannot be transferred to the
international sphere. Instead, it is necessary to rethink the sources of legitimacy
in light of new problems and institutions in a globalized world.
From the standpoint of political philosophy, several scholars have
formulated alternative democratic models applicable to the international
sphere: 82 deliberative democracy, 83 cosmopolitan democracy,84 and horizontal
democracy, 85 among others. From different perspectives, decision-makers'
accountability86 is regarded as essential in guaranteeing the legitimacy of
international lawmaking. 87  Along these lines, some insist on the need to••88 . • . 89
establish mechanisms to secure transparency and participation in decision-
making processes beyond the state. 9° Judicial review, whether national or
international, is also an important mechanism of control.9 1  In addition,
specialized technical knowledge (expertise), and more prominently, the
81. David Held, Democracy and the New International Order, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY
96, 99 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995) ("[N]ational communities by no means make
and determine decisions and policies exclusively for themselves, and governments by no means
determine what is right or appropriate exclusively for their own citizens.").
82. Id. at 96-97 ("While we cannot do without democracy, it is increasingly bankrupt in its
traditional shape and, thus, needs fundamental reform, in the short and long terms.").
83. DEIRDRE CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1997); Jens Steffek, The Legitimation of International Governance: A
Discourse Approach, 9 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 249, 271 (2003).
84. Held, supra note 81, at 106-17.
85. Slaughter, supra note 76, at 1071-73.
86. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUDIES 347 (2001); Delbruck, supra note 7, at 42.
87. Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note 12, at 17 (authors approach legitimacy problems
arising form globalization from the persepective of "global administrative law," defined as
"comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social understandings that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and
legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make.").
88. SLAUGHTER, supra note 8, at 235-37 (noting that transparency might be problematic from
the standpoint of efficiency, since one of the advantages of transnational networks is their
flexibility and informality).
89. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and
Governance, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 374 (2001) ("While the ticket to participation in
governance is knowledge and/or passion, both knowledge and passion generate perspectives that
are not those of the rest of us.").
90. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 12, at 34-39.
91. Id. at40.
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effectiveness of international regulation to achieve specific goals could
contribute to legitimacy from the standpoint of the outcome (output
legitimacy).92 Legitimacy might be derived from several combined sources.
Given the diversity of international organizations and transnational networks, the
problems of legitimacy and the adequate strategies to face them might vary.
9 3
To conclude, I suggest an account grounded on the ideal of institutional balance
to explain and justify current practices and formulate institutional arrangements
to improve the legitimacy of lawmaking processes developing within inter-,
supra-, and trans-national spheres.
The processes of decentralization of state power and recentralization in the
executive are not just a necessary evil we should embrace simply because of
improved effectiveness. Rather, an institutional balance account might provide
the grounds for legitimacy. Accordingly, we should promote institutional
arrangements capable of coping with the internationalization of lawmaking
processes from the perspective of the checks and balances ideal as a source of
legitimacy.
Hence, decentralizing lawmaking powers among a plurality of spheres
should be welcome normatively. This contributes to overcoming the risks
• 94
inherent in unlimited national sovereignty by promoting collaboration and
mutual control among state authorities and other actors within several decision-
making sites. As such, the underlying motive spurring integration in Europe was
to constrain the potential excesses of sovereign (even democratic) states by
creating a supranational community with lawmaking powers.95
At the same time, in this context, power is recentralized in the executive, to
the detriment of the legislative. Setting a stable institutional framework would
allow promoting the participation of several institutions, which need to
collaborate in collective decision-making, and creating mechanisms of checks
and balances among them. The pervasive criticism of the EU as democratically
illegitimate emerges from comparing the EU with a conceptual model of
representative democracy that cannot be transferred to the international sphere
and does not even exist within the domestic sphere in its ideal version.96 Some
have suggested that if the EU is compared to the actual functioning of member
92. Delbruck, supra note 7, at 42-43.
93. Id. at 43.
94. Paul Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259,264 (2004) ("A regime of
nation-states was a regime at war or anticipating the possibility of war.").
95. Weiler, supra note 74, at 341 ("A central plank of the project of European integration may
be seen, then, as an attempt to control the excesses of the modem nation-state in Europe,
especially, but not only, its propensity to violent conflict .... ").
96. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 66 at 169-70; MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24 (1966) (The same tendency toward executive
aggrandizement exists within modem domestic polities.).
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states' democracies, the democratic deficit criticism fades away. 97 Furthermore,
admittedly, globalization creates pressures and incentives to develop forms of
international collective regulation. If compared with the alternative of an
heterogeneous group of international agreements exclusively dominated by the
executive, the establishment of a stable institutional framework, such as the EU,
offers more advantages not only from an efficiency standpoint (avoiding
transaction and negotiation costs), but also from a legitimacy standpoint.
Decision-making processes become more transparent, and it is then possible to
mandate the participation of diverse institutions representing varied interests.
EU lawmaking procedures are founded on the twofold legitimacy of state
governments represented in the Council and citizens in the European Parliament.
The Commission contributes to the institutional balance in representation of the
community interest.99 Thus, a plurality of institutions (checking each other)
must collaborate in supranational lawmaking.' 00  Furthermore, the ECJ
guarantees that EU institutions do not exceed their powers and that EU norms
respect fundamental rights. The role of national parliaments, however, is still
unsatisfactory. Yet, with the alternative of a web of ad hoc international
agreements national parliaments could be totally ignored, with little hope to
improve their position. In addition, the EU is a system of multilevel governance,
in which the implementation of EU law requires the collaboration of all national
authorities. Hence, within the EU institutional framework, there are important
mechanisms of power distribution and control, both horizontally (among EU
institutions) and vertically (between the EU and the member states). This is not
to mean that EU institutional arrangements are totally satisfactory, but the
creation of an institutional framework for supranational lawmaking contributes
to ground the legal outcomes' legitimacy.
97. Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the
European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 621 ("When judged by the practices of existing
nation-states and in the context of a multi-level system, there is little evidence that the EU suffers
from a fundamental democratic deficit." This argument, however, does not necessarily lead to
deny the democratic deficit, but emphasizes that it is not privative of the international sphere.
Emphatically, this argument makes us aware that sometimes we ask more from international
institutions than from domestic institutions from the standpoint of democracy.).
98. CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 66, at 170.
99. Craig, supra note 48, at 38-40.
100. Id. at 40 ("The very structure of decision-making under the co-decision procedure forces
the players to re-evaluate their preferences in the light of the opinions expressed by the other
participants.").
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V. CONCLUSION: AN "INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE" ACCOUNT
Internationalization of lawmaking processes de-concentrates public power
among a multiplicity of inter-, supra-, and trans-national spheres, on the one
hand; and it re-concentrates power in the executive, on the other hand. As a
result, the unitary conception of the state and the domestic constitutional balance
of powers are altered. These transformations respond to the needs of
globalization, but they might be troublesome from the standpoint of
representative democracy. The legitimacy of the exercise of public power
through new forms of international decision-making should be grounded in a
model of checks and balances. From this standpoint, the plurality of spheres of
international lawmaking rightly promotes collaboration and mutual control
among state authorities and other actors. The parallel enhancement of executive
power might be disciplined through institutional arrangements targeted to
monitor its power. Within the domestic order, the mechanisms of control in the
hands of national parliaments should be strengthened, since executive action
beyond the state has an increasing impact upon national public policies.
Regarding the international order, given its particular features and limitations,
decision-making processes should be designed to secure mutual checks and
balances among institutions representing diverse interests. Along these lines, the
development of an institutional framework for lawmaking would promote
transparency and participation of several institutions in a deliberative process in
search for the common good. More thought needs to be devoted to what
institutions and in representation of what interests we should aspire in these
multiple spheres. As such, institutional balance as a mechanism to enhance
participation and deliberation among institutions representing diverse interests
and values in search for the common good may well be associated to a
deliberative notion of democracy. 10 1 Ultimately, the new conflicts and tensions
stemming from the internationalization of lawmaking processes call for our
political imagination to formulate models of legitimacy that permit the
reconciliation of democracy with a plurality of decision-making sites at the inter-
, supra-, and trans-national levels.
101. Id. at 36-42.

